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NOTES
Constitutional Law
STATE PRICE FIXING FOR PERSONAL SERVICES
UNDER THE GUISE OF THE EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER
Introduction
Price fixing for the personal services of the barbering and dry cleaning
trades has engaged the attention of several state courts for the past
seventeen years. Such price fixing has been sustained in Florida, Louisi-
ana, Minnesota, New Mexico and Oklahoma; and rejected in Alabama,
Arkansas, Arizona, California, Indiana, Iowa, Oregon and Tennessee.
Generally, every decision has been rendered by a divided court, with
the minority objecting vigorously to the ground upon which the majority
opinion is based. All agree that the right to fix prices is derived from the
police power of the state, and that conditions must exist which invoke
its action.'
Those courts that have sustained such regulations have based their
opinions on the principle that the trade or business in connection with
which the services are to be performed must be a business "affected with
a public interest." These courts have found a relationship between prices
and public health or welfare in justifying the exercise of the police power
by the legislatures.2
Those courts that have taken the opposite view in holding such price
fixing legislation unconstitutional have stressed the fact that the con-
stitutional safeguards for individual rights and liberties do not permit
legislative exercise of the police power in this field. More specifically, the
abridgment of the privileges and immunities, and due process and equal
protection provisions of the Constitution are invoked to strike down the
price fixing statutes. These courts deny that the trade or business is so
"affected with a public interest" or clothed with a public use as to war-
rant the legislatures, through the police power, to fix minimum prices. 3
The reason the legislatures wish to regulate the prices of the barber
and dry cleaning businesses is to relieve these businesses from the ruth-
less competition and destructive price cutting that takes place within
them.4 The small businessmen in these trades suffered severely during the
Great Depression. Many of the statutes enacted during that period were
I State v. McMasters, 204 Minn. 438, 283 N.W. 767, 770 (1939).
2 Ibid.
3 See, e.g., Edwards v. State Board of Barber Examiners, 72 Ariz. 108, 231 P.2d
450,452-3 (1951).
4 See dissent, State Board of Dry Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners, 254 P.2d
29, 37 (Cal. 1953), for description of competition in the dry cleaning trade in
California.
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cited as emergency measures; 5 others were based on the unfair trade
practice acts." But the legislatures in most of the statutes relied on the
public health and safety aspect: minimum prices were needed in order
to maintain health and safety requirements. It is the purpose that is
stated by the legislatures in the preambles to the statutes, as well as the
effect of such statutes, that the courts consider in determining their con-
stitutionality.
Courts Upholding the Price Fixing Measures
Most courts, in upholding the constitutionality of minimum prices for
barbers, have used the test that those businesses or trades "affected with
a public interest" may be regulated by the legislatures,7 and the barber
trade has been found to be so affected.8 This conclusion has been drawn
from the fact that the services of the barber "directly affect the human
anatomy," 9 and minimum prices are necessary to enable the barber to
maintain health and sanitary requirements which might otherwise be
sacrificed in price wars and unfair competition.' 0 This reason has been
given in holding that the barber trade is "affected with a public interest"
and subject to price regulations in spite of the fact that at least three of
the states so holding had other laws enforcing cleanliness in barber shops
and preventing diseased barbers from plying their trade."
The Supreme Court of Florida has found legislative authority to fix
reasonable prices on the ground that the business of barbering is of a
public nature,'2 and the Florida constitution has given express authority
to the legislature to regulate such businesses in order to correct certain
evils which may exist within them.' 3 Moreover this court has taken a
5 Ex parte Kazas, 22 Cal. App.2d 161, 70 P.2d 962, 963 (1937) ; Duncan v. Des
Moines, 222 Iowa 218, 268 N.W. 547 (1936); State v. Greeson, 174 Tenn. 178, 124
S.W.2d 253, 255 (1939).
6 State v. McMasters, 204 Minn. 438, 283 N.W. 767 (1939).
7 This test was first used by the United States Supreme Court in Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877), and by it, whether intentionally or not, the Court placed
a limitation on the price fixing power of the states. The test was subsequently used
to determine the validity, under the due process clause, of state regulation of business.
8 McRae v. Robbins, 151 Fla. 109, 9 So.2d 284 (1942); Board of Barber Exam-
iners v. Parker, 190 La. 214, 182 So. 485 (1938) ; Arnold v. Board of Barber Exam-
iners, 45 N.M. 57, 109 P.2d 779 (1941); State Dry Cleaners' Board v. Compton,
201 Okla. 284, 205 P.2d 286 (1949).
9 Board of Barber Examiners v. Parker, 190 La. 214, 182 So. 485, 505 (1938).
10 Herrin v. Arnold, 183 Okla. 392, 82 P.2d 977 (1938).
11 Board of Barber Examiners v. Parker, 190 La. 214, 182 So. 485, 492 (1938);
Arnold v. Board of Barber Examiners, 45 N.M. 57, 109 P.2d 779, 786 (1941);
Herrin v. Arnold, 183 Okla. 392, 82 P.2d 977, 979 (1938).
12 McRae v. Robbins, 151 Fla. 109, 9 So.2d 284 (1942).
13 FLA. CoNs?. Art. XVI, § 30: "The Legislature is invested with full power to
pass laws for the correction of abuses and to prevent unjust discrimination and ex-
cessive charges by persons and corporations engaged as common carriers in trans-
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very liberal view of the "public interest" test in legislation fixing mini-
mum prices for the dry cleaning industry. Miami Laundry Co. v. Florida
Dry Cleaning & Laundry Board, 134 Fla. 1, 183 So. 759, 763 (1938):
There is no magic in the phrase, "clothed with or affected with a public
interest." Any business is affected by a public interest when it reaches such
proportions that the interest of the public demands that it be reasonably
regulated to conserve the rights of the public and when this point is reached,
the liberty of contract must necessarily be restricted. If the regulation in-
volves the question of price limitation, it will be upheld unless clearly shown
to be arbitrary, discriminating, or beyond the power of the legislature to
enforce.
The court went on to uphold minimum prices for dry cleaning since such
action by the legislature was not clearly arbitrary, discriminatory or un-
warranted.
Three United States Supreme Court cases, Adkins v. Children's Hos-
pital,'4 Nebbia v. New York 15 and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,16
are mentioned frequently in both the opinions upholding and those deny-
ing the constitutionality of personal service price fixing. One especially,
the Nebbia case, is relied upon as giving authority to legislatures to fix
prices for barbers and dry cleaners. The Supreme Court in this case
approved a legislative act of the State of New York establishing mini-
mum prices for milk on the theory of a close connection between such
prices and the survival of their milk industry. The act was held to be in
the interest of the public health.
The following passages from that decision are often cited or referred
to by the courts as giving Supreme Court approbation to regulation of
the barber or dry cleaning business by setting out minimum prices for
their services: 17
The thought seems nevertheless to have persisted that there is something
peculiarly sacrosanct about the price one may charge for what he makes or
sells, and that, however able to regulate other elements of manufacture or
trade, with incidental effect upon price, the state is incapable of directly
controlling the price itself. This view was negatived many years ago.
And further: 18
The Constitution does not secure to anyone liberty to conduct his busi-
ness in such fashion as to inflict injury upon the public at large, or upon
any substantial group of the people. Price control, like any other form of
regulation, is unconstitutional only if arbitrary, discriminatory, or demon-
strably irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to adopt, and hence an
unnecessary and unwarranted interference with individual liberty.
porting persons and property, or performing other services of a public nature; and
shall provide for enforcing such laws by adequate penalties or forfeitures."
14 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
15 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
16 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
17 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 532 (1934).
18 Id. at 538-39.
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The courts sustaining price fixing put such legislation to this con-
stitutional test proposed in Nebbia, that is, whether the various statutes
or ordinances providing for minimum prices are arbitrary, discriminatory
or have an unreasonable relation to the legislative purpose.19 As viewed
by the courts upholding price fixing in this field these statutes and or-
dinances meet this test.
The West Coast Hotel Co. case, decided in 1937, three years after the
Nebbia decision, held that the minimum wage law for minors and women
of the State of Washington was valid and did not violate the due process
clause of the Constitution. Here the Court expressly overruled Adkins v.
Children's Hospital, the case which held unconstitutional an act of Con-
gress which authorized a designated board in the District of Columbia to
fix minimum wages for women and children to supply the necessary costs
of living.
Some of the earlier decisions 20 in which price fixing measures in the
barbering trade were held unconstitutional were based mainly on Adkins.
After this case was overruled by the West Coast Hotel Co. decision, these
earlier cases were no longer considered authoritative, and the Nebbia
and West Coast Hotel Co. cases have been cited as controlling authority
for sustaining price fixing.2 1 Those courts which have not followed these
two cases and which persisted in holding the price regulations uncon-
stitutional are considered "contrary to the weight of recent authority and
the better reasoned decisions." 22
A few of the courts have attempted to resolve the apparent confflict
between their decisions restricting freedom of contract and those uphold-
ing the right to the fruits of one's own labor. It has been expressed that
the constitutional "guaranties must be determined in the light of social
19 Miami Laundry Co. v. Florida Dry Cleaning & Laundry Board, 134 Fla. 1,
183 So. 759 (1938) ; Board of Barber Examiners v. Parker, 190 La. 214, 182 So. 485
(1938); Arnold v. Board of Barber Examiners, 45 N.M. 57, 109 P.2d 779 (1941);
State Dry Cleaners' Board v. Compton, 201 Okla. 284, 205 P.2d 286 (1949) ; Herrin
v. Arnold, 183 Okla. 392, 82 P.2d 977 (1938).
20 Mobile v. Rouse, 27 Ala. App. 344, 173 So. 254, 261, cert. denied, 233 Ala.
622, 173 So. 266 (1937) ; Duncan v. Des Moines, 222 Iowa 218, 268 N.W. 547 (1936).
The basis of the position that price regulations for barbers were unconstitutional
taken by the Florida court in State ex rel. Fulton v. Ives, 123 Fla. 401, 167 So. 394
(1936) was subsequently distinguished and abandoned in Miami Laundry Co. v.
Florida Dry Cleaning & Laundry Board, 134 Fla. 1, 183 So. 759 (1938), which upheld
such price regulations for dry cleaners. Cf. McRae v. Robbins, 151 Fla. 109, 9 So.2d
284 (1942), in which the court relied upon the Florida constitution to sustain rea-
sonable price fixing for barbers in that state.
21 Miami Laundry Co. v. Florida Dry Cleaning & Laundry Board, 134 Fla. 1,
183 So. 759 (1938) ; Board of Barber Examiners v. Parker, 190 La. 214, 182 So. 485
(1938); Arnold v. Board of Barber Examiners, 45 N.M. 57, 109 P.2d 779 (1941);
State Dry Cleaners' Board v. Compton, 201 Okla. 284, 205 P.2d 286 (1949) ; Herrin
v. Arnold, 183 Okla. 392, 82 P.2d 977 (1938).
22 Arnold v. Board of Barber Examiners, 45 N.M. 57, 109 P.2d 779, 786 (1941).
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and economic conditions that prevail at the time the guaranty is pro-
posed to be exercised rather than at the time the Constitution was
approved securing it .... ,, 23 The limitations upon the police power are
looked upon as being
2 4
... plastic in their nature and will expand to meet the actual requirements
of an advancing civilization and adjust themselves to the necessities of our
multiplying complexities in moral, sanitary, economic, and political con-
ditions.
The Supreme Court of Florida has taken the position that there are
two factors to consider in all such cases, namely, the protection of the
public on the one hand, and the freedom to run one's trade or business
as one sees fit, on the other.
25
Courts Striking Down the Price Fixing Measures
Those courts which deny that minimum price fixing statutes for per-
sonal services are constitutional distinguish the decision in Nebbia v.
New York from the personal service regulations before them.26
Price cutting by the competitors in the New York milk business was
producing waste and was threatening ultimately to cut off the supply of
milk and to destroy the industry itself. The result would have affected
most disastrously the public welfare. There is nothing like that, it was
said, in the personal services trades.27 Milk is essential, and its produc-
tion and distribution a paramount industry of the state; it has peculiar
factcrs of instability calling for special control. 28 Those factors are not
present in the barber and dry cleaning cases before the courts. These two
personal service trades, however convenient to a large portion of the
public, are not basic or paramount industries.
The Nebbia decision, it has been pointed out, did not open the flood
gates to price controls on any and every kind of business, trade or occu-
pation.20 The following passages from that opinion are quoted to em-
phasize this point: 30
23 Miami Laundry Co. v. Florida Dry Cleaning & Laundry Board, 134 Fla. 1,
183 So. 759, 762 (1938).
24 Ex parte Tindall, 102 Okla. 192, 229 Pac. 125, 130 (1924), quoted in Herrin
v. Arnold, 183 Okla. 392, 82 P.2d 977, 979 (1938).
25 Miami Laundry Co. v. Florida Dry Cleaning & Laundry Board, 134 Fla. 1,
183 So. 759, 764 (1938).
26 Mobile v. Rouse, 27 Ala. App. 344, 173 So. 254, 262-63, cert. denied, 233 Ala.
622, 173 So. 266 (1937); Noble v. Davis, 204 Ark. 156, 161 S.W.2d 189 (1942);
Christian v. La Forge, 194 Ore. 450, 242 P.2d 797 (1952). See dissent on rehearing
Board of Barber Examiners v. Parker, 190 La. 214, 182 So. 485, 514 (1938).
27 State v. Greeson, 174 Tenn. 178, 124 S.W.2d 253 (1939). See dissent on re-
hearing, Board of Barber Examiners v. Parker, 190 La. 214, 182 So. 485, 514 (1938).
28 Mobile v. Rouse, 27 Ala. App. 344, 173 So. 254, 263, cert. denied, 233 Ala. 622,
173 So. 266 (1937).
29 State Board of Dry Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners, 234 P.2d 220, 225
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. a regulation valid for one sort of business, or in given circumstances,
may be invalid for another sort, or for the same business under other
circumstances, because the reasonableness of each regulation depends upon
the relevant facts.
And again: 31
It is clear that there is no dosed class or category of businesses affected
with a pablic interest, and the function of courts in the application of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is to determine in each case whether
circumstances vindicate the challenged regulation as a reasonable exertion
of governmental authority or condemn it as arbitrary or discriminatory.
The courts holding these price fixing measures unconstitutional state
that the earlier decisions32 relying on Adkins, which was subsequently
overruled, were based on the fact that the statutes of those states were
not regulatory, but mere price fixing statutes, having no real or sub-
stantial relation to the public health, safety, welfare or prosperity. And
therefore, on that basis, the earlier cases are distinguishable from the
Nebbia decision.
3 3
These courts have held the barbering trade not to be a business "af-
fected with a public interest." 34 They are unable to see, in either logic
or common sense, the relationship between public health and safety and
price fixing in the barbering profession. 33 State v. Greeson36 and Noble
v. Davis3 7 quote with approval the dissenting opinion on rehearing in
Board oj Barber Examiners v. Parker, which points out the lack of any
reasonable relationship between prices and health in the barber trade: 38
The only question in these cases is whether a statute authorizing a public
board to fix the minimum fees that a barber may charge for his services
really tends to protect the public health. It is not disputed that the barbers'
trade is one which may endanger the public health, and which is therefore
subject to regulation by the Legislature. But I do not see how an act of the
Legislature prescribing the minimum fees ... that a barber may charge
for his services can protect, or have a tendency to protect, the public health.
The only appropriate way in which the Legislature can protect the public
health, or promote the public welfare .. .is to establish sanitary require-
(Cal. App. 1951), aff'd, 254 P.2d 29 (1953); Christian v. La Forge, 194 Ore. 450,
242 P.2d 797, 806 (1952).
30 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934).
31 Id. at 536.
32 See cases cited note 19 supra.
33 Noble v. Davis, 204 Ark. 156, 161 S.W.2d 189 (1942); State v. Greeson, 174
Tenn. 178, 124 S.W.2d 253 (1939).
34 Mobile v. Rouse, 27 Ala. App. 344, 173 So. 254, cert. denied, 233 Ala. 622, 173
So. 266 (1937); Ex parte Kazas, 22 Cal. App.2d 161, 70 P.2d 962 (1937); State
Board of Barber Examiners v. Cloud, 220 Ind. 552, 44 N.E.2d 972 (1942).
35 Edwards v. State Board of Barber Examiners, 72 Ariz. 108, 231 P.2d 450
(1951). See concurring opinion, Revne v. Trade Commission, 113 Utah 155, 192
P.2d 563 (1948).
36 174 Tenn. 178, 124 S.W.2d 253, 258 (1939).
37 204 Ark. 156, 161 S.W.2d 189, 191 (1942).
38 190 La. 214, 182 So. 485, 512 (1938).
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ments . . . and to enforce them..... If a barber complies with all of the
requirements . . . it cannot possibly endanger the public health or the
public welfare ... to charge lower rates for his services than the proprietors
of the deluxe barber shops....
The general welfare division of the police power cannot be invoked to
bring the minimum price regulations for barbers within constitutional
bounds.39 In this connection, the Supreme Court of California has said 40
that to justify and support the term "general welfare," legislation should
at least promote the welfare of the general public as contrasted with that
of a small percentage or insignificant numerical proportion of the
citizenry. Thus these courts have concluded that the legislation before
them was not intended to promote the welfare of the people as a whole,
but only a small group, the barbers, comprising a very small proportion
of the population of their states.41
Many of the courts striking down these price fixing statutes emphasize
the constitutional guaranties of personal liberty - the right to acquire,
hold and dispose of property, and the right to contract with respect to
one's own labor.42 The later cases especially urge this argument. The
right to purchase and sell one's own labor is guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution. This and the other liberties can
only be sacrificed on a clear showing of a benefit to the public commen-
surate with the loss of the individual rights.43 In a recent case, Christian
v. La Forge, it was stated: 44
It is only when the interests and welfare of the public in general are
clearly threatened by the unrestricted exercise of the individual right, that
the individual right must give way to reasonable limitation and regulation
for the public good. The courts must ever be watchful to protect the
personal rights guaranteed by state and federal constitutions, and to prevent
encroachments thereon by legislative fiat, unless actually essential to the
protection of the public welfare.
A favorite argument of the courts is to consider the effect of these price
regulations by conjuring up the extent to which such regulations may be
imposed on other trades or businesses if allowed for the barber or dry
cleaning industry. Such regulations, it is said, pour the barbers into a
common mould, turning them out exactly alike regardless of skill or
39 Ex parte Kazas, 22 Cal. App.2d 161, 70 P.2d 962 (1937) ; State Board of Bar-
ber Examiners v. Cloud, 220 Ind. 552, 44 N.E.2d 972 (1942) ; Christian v. La Forge,
175 Ore. 154, 242 P.2d 797 (1952).
40 Ex parte Kazas, 22 Cal. App.2d 161, 70 P.2d 962, 968 (1937).
41 See cases cited note 39 supra.
42 Edwards v. State Board of Barber Examiners, 72 Ariz. 108, 231 P.2d 450, 453
(1951); Noble v. Davis, 204 Ark. 156, 161 S.W.2d 189, 192 (1942); State Board of
Barber Examiners v. Cloud, 220 Ind. 552, 44 N.E.2d 972, 980 (1942); Christian v.
La Forge, 175 Ore. 154, 242 P.2d 797 (1952).
43 Edwards v. State Board of Barber Examiners, 72 Ariz. 108, 231 P.2d 450
(1951) ; State v. Greeson, 174 Tenn. 178, 124 S.W.2d 253, 256 (1939).
44 194 Ore. 450, 242 P.2d 797, 803 (1952).
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efficiency.45 While the butcher, the baker and the candlestick maker may
set the price for their services, the barber is deprived of this privilege.
48
What today is considered as a shield for a particular trade may tomorrow
become a sword in the hands of the public, if they choose to enact maxi-
mum price legislation. 47 One can test the soundness of a principle, it is
stated, by applying it to different factual situations: fees could be fixed
for physicians and dentists, hotels and restaurants, ad infinitum.4 s
The latest case on the subject of price fixing in the field of personal
services comes from the Supreme Court of California. 49 That court had
before it the question of the validity of the California Dry Cleaner's Act.
This act authorized the State Board of Dry Cleaners to establish a mini-
mum price schedule for services of dry cleaners, dyers and pressers. The
act was declared unconstitutional in a four to three decision on the
authority of Ex parte Kazas.50 The court held the act did not provide for
the general welfare, nor for public health, safety or morals. It compared
Nebbia with the Kazas case respecting the use of the phrase "affected
with a public interest," and implied that the dry cleaning industry in
California was not so "affected with a public interest" as to subject it to
legislative control for the public good. A vigorous minority dissented 5 1
on the grounds that the "affected with a public interest" test has been
discarded, and that there were economic, health and safety grounds on
which the legislature could reasonably have concluded that minimum
prices were needed, and therefore, in view of the Nebbia and West Coast
Hotel Co. cases, the act should be held constitutional.
Conclusion
There is no end in sight of the strong disagreement over the constitu-
tionality of personal service price fixing legislation. When, in the future,
courts are faced with such a question, they will have sufficient authority
upon which to rely whether they choose one side or the other. This is a
problem of a social and economic nature. However, social and economic
programs are for the legislature, not the judiciary. If the programs are
put to the constitutional tests, in which individual liberty is balanced
with the rights of the public, the judiciary has done its duty.
James A. Uhl
45 E .arte Kazas, 22 Cal. App.2d 161, 70 P.2d 962, 964 (1937).
48 Mobile v. Rouse, 27 Ala. App. 344, 173 So. 254, 260, cert. denied, 233 Ala.
622, 173 So. 266 (1937).
47 Christian v. La Forge, 194 Ore. 450, 242 P.2d 797, 807 (1952).
48 State v. Greeson, 174 Tenn. 178, 124 S.W.2d 253, 258 (1939).
49 State Board of Dry Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners, 254 P.2d 29 (Cal.
1953).
0 22 Cal. App.2d 161, 70 P.2d 962 (1937).
51 State Board of Dry Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners, 254 P.2d 29, 37, 39
(Cal. 1953).
